SOMALIA

From August 26, 1993, to 21 October, 1993, Company B, a Platoon from A Company and a command and control element of 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, deployed to Somalia to assist United Nations forces in bringing order to a desperately chaotic and starving nation. Their mission was to capture key leaders in order to end clan fighting in and around the city of Mogadishu. On October 3, 1993, the Rangers conducted a daring daylight raid with 1st SFOD in which several special operations helicopters were shot down. For nearly 18 hours, the Rangers delivered devastating firepower, killing an estimated 600 Somalis in what many have called the fiercest ground combat since Vietnam. Six Rangers paid the supreme sacrifice in accomplishing their mission. Their courage and selfless service epitomized the values espoused in the Ranger Creed, and are indicative of the Ranger spirit of yesterday, today, and tomorrow.

Somalia Background

"It is like a porcupine, bristling with quite exceptional difficulties."

J.F.C. Fuller, 1935

Somalia was formed in 1960 by the union of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland.

At civil war since 1977, Somalia has approximately 14 major factions participating in internecine warfare. The majority of Somalis are Sunni Moslems.

In 1991 the Somali government collapsed after decades of civil war where killings and beheadings became common occurrences. The already weakened infrastructure coupled with a drought led to the death of hundreds of thousands of Somalis by starvation.

Food relief missions, initiated by private organizations, were seized by various clans who in turn used these assets to procure additional weapons and pay their followers.

The intrinsic violent nature of the Somali clans hampered further relief efforts to such a point that the United Nations approved Resolution 751 in April 1992, to provide humanitarian aid to Somalia (UNOSOM I). Unable to properly accomplish the mission due to the lack of proper resources, the United States initiated Operation Provide Relief. Although temporarily successful and welcomed by many Somalis, additional security measures were needed and a few months later Operation Restore Hope sought to provide military as well as humanitarian support.

 

In March 1993, Operation Restore Hope was turned over to UN Peacekeeping Forces and UNOSOM II was created, making it the first ever UN directed peacekeeping mission. The mandate called for three distinct phases; disarming Somali clans, rebuild the political infrastructure and create a more secure environment. Twenty-one nations contributed personnel to UNOSOM II. Turkish General Bir and retired Admiral Jonathan Howe, acting as special representative to the UN Secretary-General, were in command. US General Montgomery led a US Quick Reaction Force (QRF).

Effects of UNOSOM II:

UN nation-building in Somali threatened certain clans, most notably the Somali National Alliance (SNA) under the leadership of Mohammed Aidid, the former chief of staff.

Headquartered in Mogadishu, Aidid; trained in guerrilla war, quickly initiated a campaign of resistance to the UN which ultimately led to a series of ambushes killing 24 Pakistani Peacekeepers. These soldiers were physically torn apart and dismembered by the doped-up clansmen.

The UN was forced to demonstrate its willingness to protect its peacekeepers and the next day the UN and the White House, under the leadership of UN Secretary-General Boutros ­Ghali and Madeline Albright, passed Resolution 837, authorizing action against those responsible: namely Aidid.

Strained relations between the Clinton Administration and the military (gay-rights, general distrust toward Armed Forces) led to the exclusion of any input from the Pentagon regarding Resolution 837.

The humanitarian mission changed to a military one. Gunships arrived, and with the additional firepower numerous Aidid assets were destroyed or seized.

Personalities:

Boutros-Ghali had been a long time enemy of Aidid's and unable to quickly resolve the escalating military situation in Mogadishu, Howe placed a $25,000 bounty on Aidid. The battles became personal.

More Somalis began to see the UN, under the leadership of the US, as a threat, not as a neutral party. The SNA withdrew a little, and the gunships were sent back in order to open negotiations with Aidid. However, smaller engagements continued. Several UN contingents, most notably the Italians, had non-aggression pacts with the SNA.

Bir and Howe became frustrated enough to request proper troops for the manhunt ­ SFOD-Delta and US Army Rangers.

Task Force Ranger (TFR)

TFR was placed under the command of General William Garrison. Although numerous raids took place, Aidid was not caught. Additional fire power in the form of mechanized vehicles and armor was denied by the Secretary of Defense Les Aspin after an American helicopter was shot down. Frustrated and under pressure from the White House, which had secretly opened negotiations with Aidid, TFR undertook an unnecessary and daring day-light raid, resulting in the battles of October 3-4, 1993. 18 American servicemen died. Somali casualties range from 350-700 killed and thousands wounded. The White House withdrew US troops shortly thereafter.

October 3-4, 1993 timeline

2:49 PM Two principle targets, Habr Gidr clan leaders, spotted at a residence in central Mogadishu.

3:32 PM The force launches: nineteen aircraft, twelve vehicles and 160 men.

3:42 PM The Assault begins. the boys hit the target house and four Ranger chalks rope in -- one Ranger, Private Todd Blackburn, misses the rope and falls 70 ft. to the street.

3:47 PM Large crowds of Somalis converging on the target area.

3:58 PM One of the vehicles, a five-ton truck, is hit and disabled by a rocket propelled grenade, several men are wounded.

4:00 PM Forces of armed Somalis converging on the target area from all over Mogadishu.

4:02 PM Assault force reports both clan leaders and about 21 others in custody, as the force prepares to pull out, three vehicles are detached to rush the wounded Private Blackburn back to the base.

4:15 PM Fighting and confusion delays loading the prisoners and pulling out. 4:20 PM Black Hawk Super 61 is hit by a rocket propelled grenade and crashes five blocks northeast of the target.

4:22 PM Crowds of Somalis racing toward the crash site.

4:26 PM Prisoners loaded, the convoy and ground forces all begin moving toward the downed chopper. Black Hawk Super Six Four, piloted by Michael Durant, takes the downed chopper's place in orbit over the fight.

4:28 PM Search and rescue team ropes in to assist the downed crew. Both pilot and copilot are dead.

4:35 PM Convoy makes a wrong turn and begins wandering lost through city streets, sustaining heavy casualties.

4:40 PM Durant's Black Hawk, Super Six Four, is hit and crashes about a mile southwest of the target. Hostile crowds begin moving toward it.

4:42 PM Two snipers, Sergeants Randy Shughart and Gary Gordon, are inserted by helicopter to help protect the injured Durant and his crew.

4:54 PM The Lost Convoy, with more than half of its force wounded or dead, abandons its search for the first downed Black Hawk and begins fighting its way back to the base.

5:03 PM A smaller, emergency convoy is dispatched in an attempt to rescue the men stranded at Durant's crash site. It encounters immediate obstacles.

5:34 PM Both convoys, battered and bleeding, link up and abandon the effort to break through to Durant. The remainder of the ground force of Rangers and commandos are converging around the first crash site, sustaining many casualties. Ranger Corporal Jamie Smith is among those shot.

5:40 PM Somali crowds overrun Durant's crash site, killing Shughart, Gordon, and every member of the crew except Durant, who is carried off by militia through the city.

5:45 PM Both convoys return to the base. Ninety-nine men remain trapped and surrounded in the city around the first downed Black Hawk, fighting for their lives. Corporal Smith bleeding heavily, medic requests immediate evacuation.

7:08 PM Black Hawk Super Six makes a daring re-supply run, dropping water, ammo and medical supplies to the trapped force. It is badly damaged, cannot land to evacuate Corporal Smith, limps back to base.

8:27 PM Corporal Smith dies.

10:00 PM Giant convoy, two companies of 10th Mt. Division troops along with the remainder of Task Force Ranger, Pakistani tanks and Malaysian armored vehicles, forms at Mogadishu's New Port, and begins planning the rescue. 11:23 PM The giant rescue convoy moves out, blazing into the city.

1:55 AM Rescue convoy reaches the trapped Ranger force. A second half of the convoy reaches the site of Durant's downed Black Hawk. There is no trace of the crew.

3:00 AM Forces still struggling to remove the pinned body of Cliff Wolcott, pilot of Super Six One.

5:30 AM Wolcott's body is finally recovered. Vehicles roll out of the city. Ranger force is left to run out of the city through gunfire-"The Mogadishu Mile."

6:30 AM The force returns to the Pakistani Stadium. Eighteen dead, 73 injured.

Alternate time-line from DeLong and Tuckey - Mogadishu October 3, 1993

1:00 PM Joint Operations Command Center briefing where intelligence was bared indicating top Farid Aidid lieutenants were ready for the picking.

2:15 PM Task Force Ranger places section of Mogadishu offlimits; first indication to various U.S. units throughout city that operation might occur.

3:30 PM Lead pilot gets "Irene" code word; mission begins.

3:37 PM Task Force Ranger headquarters issues REDCON ONE alert keeping men on 30-minute "string."

3:50 PM Ground convoy arrives in position waiting for signal to load prisoners. 4:00 PM Insertion complete with assault forces and blockers on the outside doing their job; enemy fire starting to increase.

4:10 PM First notification of Cliff Wolcott's downed helicopter.

4:20 PM Michael Durant's helicopter is shot down about a mile to the south of first crash site.

4:30 PM Ground convoy attempts to reach Wolcott crash site but runs into fierce Somali resistance. 10th Mountain Quick Reaction Force summoned to airport.

4:35 PM Snipers Shughart and Gordon dropped off at Durant crash site to help fend off armed crowds.

5:00 PM Ground convoy decides to forsake rescue mission after taking too many injuries and returns to airfield.

5:15 PM Hastily assembled Ranger rescue team takes off for Wolcott crash site and encounters furious resistance.

5:24 PM QRF arrives at airport for intense rescue planning.

6:18 PM Ground convoy arrives at airfield.

6:30 PM QRF force takes off in combat column for rescue effort at Durant crash site.

7:00 PM QRF column is forced to turn back after encountering fierce Somali firepower.

7:20 PM Ranger company at Wolcott crash site establishes defense perimeter to wait for rescue force.

8:30 PM Planning just about complete at airport for multinational rescue force that includes QRF soldiers aided by Malaysian and Pakistani armored vehicles and personnel.

10:40 PM Relief column including about 300 soldiers from three nations ready to pull out.

11:30 PM Relief column pulls out.

Midnight Two APCs with rescue troops heading for northern (Wolcott) crash site turn south instead and end up stranded after being hit by Somali RPG attack.

1:50 AM QRF relief column arrives at Wolcott crash site.

3:00 AM Stranded rescuers picked up by Malaysian APCs from troops at southern (Durant) crash site.

5:20 AM QRF and Rangers extract bodies from Wolcott crash site and prepare to move back to the airport.

5:45 AM Convoy arrives back at sports stadium.

Conclusions

1) The Clinton Administration, unhappy with inheriting the Somalia problem and distrusting the military, failed to properly analyze the internal political situation.

2) Personal dislikes toward Aidid by Howe and Boutros-Ghali only alienated the parties further.

3) The Clinton Administration's failure in policy and subsequent failure in supporting its own policies (denial of additional resources) further failed when they opened secret negotiations with Aidid without informing TFR.

4) The intelligence and military apperatis' dependence on high technology in a zero-tech environment clearly demonstrated a command failure. Human intelligence gathering was non-existent and not properly supported throughout. Some analysts believe that Aidid set-up TFR with faulty intelligence. There is no direct evidence supporting that statement. It has been asserted that intelligence collaboration with other UN forces would have been appropriate. Given the "neutrality" stance of certain countries this would have led to a disaster (see below).

5) Certain UN contingents had understandings with the SNA. The Italians have been accused of alerting the clans whenever US troops (TFR) departed for missions.

6) TFR failed on an operational level in that no contingencies were made for multiple helicopter crashes and/or proper incorporation of the QRF (10th Mountain).

7) The battle in Mogadishu on October 3-4, 1993 represent one of the greatest feats of American combat arms.

8) The so-called failure in Somalia led to the Clinton Administration's refusal to intervene in the Rwandan civil war which killed at least 500,000 inhabitants.

The military withdrawal from Somalia enraged many servicemen and demonstrated a lack of foreign policy leadership.

 

NIGHT OF A THOUSAND CASUALTIES

BATTLE TRIGGERED U.S. DECISION TO WITHDRAW FROM SOMALIA

By Rick Atkinson

Washington Post Foreign Service

FIREFIGHT IN MOGADISHU: THE LAST MISSION OF TASK FORCE RANGER 2/2 , in a series

Monday, January 31, 1994 ; Page A01

MOGADISHU, SOMALIA -- MOGADISHU, SOMALIA -- In the war-shattered neighborhood of south Mogadishu that the Somalis sardonically call "Bosnia," militia Col. Ali Aden had finished his Sunday lunch on Oct. 3 and was lounging in the shade with his platoon when an urgent order crackled from the radio.

American soldiers had swept into a building near the Olympic Hotel and were about to spirit away 24 Somali prisoners, including two key lieutenants of fugitive militia leader Mohamed Farah Aideed. Aden, a 41-year-old former officer in the Somali army, was to muster his militia immediately. "Reinforce the western sector," commanded his superior, Col. Sharif Hassan Giumale, who had moved to a covert headquarters several hundred yards from the hotel. "Don't let reinforcements reach the enemy pocket."

Dressed for combat in leather sandals and faded jeans, Aden ordered his men to grab their weapons. He instructed two junior officers to remain in the compound near Digfer Hospital to organize ambushes along likely reinforcement routes from the U.S. bases at the airfield and university. Then he and 40 others jammed into two rattletrap vans and headed for the faint sound of gunfire a mile to the east.

For the next 15 hours, throughout the night of Oct. 3-4, Somalis and Americans would slug it out in a fierce battle that ultimately turned the tide of the United Nations' intervention in Somalia. The first installment of this two-part series recounted the deployment of Task Force Ranger -- including Delta Force commandos -- in an effort to capture Aideed and other leaders of his militia. Today's account, drawn from interviews with dozens of Somali and U.S. military sources, details the bloody consequences of what proved to be Task Force Ranger's last mission, a daylight raid in downtown Mogadishu that would leave hundreds dead and lead to President Clinton's decision to withdraw all U.S. forces from the Horn of Africa by March 31.

The buses carrying Aden and his militia careened down Armed Forces Street before turning into an alley short of Hiwadag Street. Dismounting, the platoon splintered into a half-dozen squads of six or seven men each -- plus the one woman among them. Most militia were poor marksmen, Aden knew, and he had tried to distribute at least one true sharpshooter in each squad. Darting through alleyways, sheltering in doorways and beneath trees as they eyed the helicopters overhead, the squads crept closer until they were within range of the Americans and their vehicles around the three-story building.

In addition to the militia, scores of other Somalis sprinted through the streets in a confused melee. Everyone in south Mogadishu who could put his hands on a weapon seemed to press toward the battle. Aden shouted at several to stay back, but they ignored him.

As the firing intensified, he felt growing confidence. This claustrophobic battleground, in Aideed's stronghold, was where Aden had hoped to fight. Other militia platoons, he knew, would be rushing from the north, south and east. The Americans were not supermen. In these dusty streets, where combat was reduced to rifle against rifle, they could die as easily as any Somali.

"Remember," Aden had often told his platoon, citing a Somali proverb, "one man, one bullet."

One bullet -- or, more precisely, one rocket-propelled grenade -- had already claimed two American lives. At 4:20 p.m., 40 minutes after the assault began, a round had fatally crippled the Black Hawk helicopter known as Super 6-1, which had been orbiting overhead. Spinning out of control, the helicopter heeled over nose first and smashed into an alley off Freedom Road about 300 yards east of the building that Task Force Ranger had assaulted.

The loss of a helicopter had not been unanticipated by Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison, commander of the task force. Ten days earlier, on the coast south of Mogadishu, Delta commandos had rehearsed a scenario in which a Black Hawk was downed, the pilot and co-pilot were killed, and the four injured men in back needed to be rescued. By eerie coincidence, the helicopter used in that exercise was Super 6-1, which now lay in a heap with the pilots dead and five other soldiers -- three Delta snipers and two crew chiefs -- injured.

Garrison and his planners had drafted three contingency plans, according to Army sources: insert 15 soldiers from a combat search-and-rescue Black Hawk circling nearby; alert the Quick Reaction Force from the 10th Mountain Division; move the main body of Task Force Ranger from the target building to provide more firepower at the crash site.

All three contingencies were invoked, almost simultaneously. The Quick Reaction Force, which had deployed from the University to the airfield as a precaution, was notified; for now, Task Force Ranger believed it could handle the emergency alone. In a fusillade of Somali gunfire, an MH-6 Little Bird swooped in next to the wreckage. While one pilot steadied the controls in his left hand and fired a machine gun with his right, the other pilot dashed into the alley and helped two Delta snipers, one of them mortally wounded, into the back of the helicopter. Two Ranger platoon leaders, Lt. Tom DiTomasso and Lt. Larry Perino, hurried east with their troops, trading fire with Somali gunmen also racing to the crash on parallel streets.

The search-and-rescue Black Hawk hovered near the site as 15 soldiers slid down ropes onto Freedom Road. With two men still on the ropes, a rocket-propelled grenade hit and all but severed the main rotor blades. The pilot held his hover until the final soldiers were off their ropes, then limped back to the airfield.

For the 90 or so U.S. soldiers consolidating near the downed helicopter, Freedom Road and the adjoining alley had become a killing zone. AK-47 bullets flew overhead with a loud pop, punctuated by the red streak and ominous swoosh of rocket-propelled grenades. Within an hour, 10 of the 13 men with Perino would be wounded. Delta and the search-and-rescue team suffered comparable casualties. So many Somalis swarmed through the neighborhood that helicopter gunners overhead ignored those with rifles to concentrate on the more lethal rocket-propelled grenade gunners.

To make a bad situation worse, the helicopter cockpit had folded atop the dead pilot, Chief Warrant Officer Clifton P. Wolcott. Braving hand grenades, rocket-propelled grenades and rifle fire, a half-dozen soldiers tugged in vain at the crumpled wreckage. Metal-cutting saws proved useless against the armored cockpit doors, which snapped the blades.

"No way," a frustrated soldier reported to the Delta captain on the scene. "He's really pinned. He's not coming out of there."

The American Convoy Loses Its Way

Ahmed Warsame lay in the back of a five-ton truck, listening in terror to the battle raging around him. Packed like spoons in a drawer, he and the other Somali prisoners captured on Hiwadag Street filled the truck bed. Plastic cuffs cut into Warsame's wrists, leaving scars that would be visible two months later. A Ranger wounded in the leg sat next to Warsame, furiously firing his M-16. Amid the roaring gunfire, Warsame heard another prisoner murmuring prayers from the Koran.

Task Force Ranger had intended to haul the prisoners by convoy directly back to the airfield. Instead, the Ranger battalion commander, Lt. Col. Danny McKnight, was ordered to reinforce the crash site. Although the instructions to McKnight seemed simple enough -- "go two blocks north and three blocks east" -- the labyrinthine streets were confusing. The eight vehicles lurched right, then left, then right again, unable to find the wreckage.

Gunfire raked the convoy at every intersection. Somalis sprinted across the street, spraying bullets. Three rounds spattered against the armored glass of McKnight's Humvee. A rocket-propelled grenade detonated against the cab of a truck in front of Warsame, decapitating the American driver.

The murmured verses from the Koran ceased. The praying Somali had been shot dead. Two other prisoners would be killed before the ordeal ended, as well as four U.S. soldiers. Initially too frightened to talk, the Somalis now whispered hoarsely among themselves. "Quiet!" a Ranger shouted. Warsame later claimed that at one point an enraged Ranger clubbed a handcuffed Somali in the head with his rifle butt. A Task Force Ranger spokesman recently acknowledged the incident, which he said occurred "in the heat of battle."

The convoy lurched past the Olympic Hotel where it had started. Garrison, concerned for the wounded and fearful that the mission would fail if the prisoners were not extracted, ordered McKnight's group back to the airfield.

"Even if we're all killed," Warsame told the man next to him, "this will keep them from doing something like this again."

"Quiet!" a Ranger snapped. "Keep quiet!"

A 2nd Helicopter Goes Down

A half-mile south of the Olympic Hotel, 65-year-old Muhamed Warsame -- no relation to the prisoner in the truck -- sat beneath the awning in front of his tin shack, listening to the distant roar of battle and waiting for his spaghetti dinner.

Through the open door he watched his wife, Binti Ibrahim, stirring a pot of pasta over an open fire in the kitchen. Several grandchildren played in the corner. Beyond the piece of sheet-metal that served as a front gate, a dozen other shacks ringed a small grassy field.

Warsame heard a strange throbbing, a labored engine noise coming from the east. He peered out beneath the awning in time to see a flash of dark green appear above the rooftops to the east. With a tremendous din, a Black Hawk helicopter slammed into the ground less than 50 feet from where Warsame was sitting.

The helicopter, Super 6-4, had been hit in the tail by a rocket-propelled grenade while orbiting almost directly over the wreckage of the first Black Hawk. For a few seconds -- long enough to veer toward the airfield -- the helicopter remained intact. Then abruptly the tail rotor blades disintegrated, sending the aircraft into an uncontrollable spin. The pilots had managed to partially shut off power to the main rotor blades, preventing Super 6-4 from flipping over before it slammed into the ground.

The concussion flattened several shacks, flinging shrapnel and sheets of metal through the enclave. A fragment nicked Warsame's 3-year-old granddaughter in the head. Metal shards spattered his wife's back. He scrambled inside, shooing his family into a back corner, where they cowered, listening and waiting for a chance to flee to a nearby mosque.

Desperate Moves To Save Crewmen

The destruction at 4:40 p.m. of the second Black Hawk, Super 6-4, immeasurably complicated planning for Garrison and his subordinates. Task Force Ranger had barely enough troops to defend one site; covering two was impossible. All four crewmen apparently survived the second crash.

In the next half hour, American commanders tried several desperation moves, none of them successful. A small Ranger relief column headed out from the airfield only to be driven back by heavy fire. A few minutes later, Charlie Company from the 10th Mountain's Quick Reaction Force left the airfield but was ambushed on Via Lenin by some of Ali Aden's militia. Fighting for their lives, 100 U.S. soldiers fired nearly 60,000 rounds of ammunition and hundreds of grenades in 30 minutes before retreating.

The aviation commander, Lt. Col. Thomas C. Matthews, rejected two requests to allow the co-pilots of his four MH-6 Little Birds to leave their cockpits and defend the second crash site. The Delta squadron commander also twice rejected a similar request -- to deliver two Delta snipers to the second crash site by Black Hawk -- then agreed to a third request after learning the Quick Reaction Force had been ambushed.

Super 6-2, piloted by Chief Warrant Officer Michael A. Goffena, found a small clearing 100 yards southwest of the second crash site. Goffena touched down long enough for the Delta snipers, Sgt. 1st Class Randall D. Shugart and Master Sgt. Gary I. Gordon, to leap from the Black Hawk bay. As Goffena pulled up again, he saw that the two men were uncertain which direction to go in the bewildering maze of shacks and cactus. Veering directly over the crashed helicopter, Goffena leaned out of the cockpit and pointed to the wreckage long enough for Gordon and Shugart to find their way.

Ten minutes later, however, a rocket-propelled grenade smashed into the right side of Goffena's helicopter, knocking his co-pilot unconscious and shearing away the leg of a third Delta sniper manning the door gun. The blast blew out the windshield, ripped through the number-two engine and triggered a medley of warning horns and lights in the cockpit. Goffena kept the helicopter airborne long enough to make a crash landing at the New Port.